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PLATO, TRAGEDY, THE IDEAL READER AND PLUTARCH’S
DEMETRIOS AND ANTONY1
The prologue to Plutarch’s Lives of Demetrios and Antony is much cited by
modern commentators for its claim to introduce negative examples, Lives of men
who might function as deterrents for the reader – an apparent revision of Plutar-
ch’s moral programme in the Parallel Lives.2 Earlier prologues, notably those to
the Perikles and Fabius and Aemilius and Timoleon, had encouraged the reader to
expect examples of virtuous men to imitate.3 But the Demetrios and Antony
prologue proclaims that this pair will include men ‘renowned for their vice’, men
whose Lives the reader is not expected to imitate but which will instead have a
deterrent effect.4 The subject of this paper is Plutarch’s justification for this
change of approach. It will be argued that the Demetrios and Antony prologue 1)
contains allusions to and dialogue with several passages of Plato, and a redefini-
tion of some of Plato’s statements about literature; 2) highlights the need for the
reader’s own active discrimination in evaluating and responding to the actions and
fates of the great men of history; and 3) invites the reader to approach Demetrios
and Antony as tragic heroes.5
The Demetrios and Antony begins with a contrast between our physical senses
or sense-perception (ai[sqhsi~) and our rational capacity:
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(1.1) OiJ prw`toi ta;~ tevcna~ ejoikevnai tai`~ aijsqhvsesin uJpolabovnte~ oujc h{kistav moi
dokou`si th;n peri; ta;~ krivsei~ aujtw`n katanoh`sai duvnamin, h|/ tw`n ejnantivwn oJmoivw~ eJkatevrw/
gevnei pefuvkamen ajntilambavnesqai. tou`to ga;r aujtai`~ koinovn ejsti: th`/ de; pro;~ ta; tevlh tw`n
krinomevnwn ajnafora`/ diallavttousin. (1.2) hJ me;n ga;r ai[sqhsi~ oujdevn ti ma`llon ejpi; leukw`n h]
melavnwn diagnwvsei gevgonen, oujde; glukevwn h] pikrw`n, oujde; malakw`n kai; eijkovntwn h] sklhrw`n
kai; ajntituvpwn, ajll∆ e[rgon aujth`~, eJkavstoi~ ejntugcavnousan uJpo; pavntwn te kinei`sqai kai;
kinoumevnhn pro;~ to; fronou`n ajnafevrein wJ~ pevponqen. (1.3) aiJ de; tevcnai meta; lovgou sunestw`sai
pro;~ ai{resin kai; lh`yin oijkeivou tinov~, fugh;n de; kai; diavkrousin ajllotrivou, ta; me;n ajf∆ auJtw`n
kai; prohgoumevnw~, ta; d∆ uJpe;r tou` fulavxasqai kata; sumbebhko;~ ejpiqewrou`si: kai; ga;r
ijatrikh`/ to; nosero;n kai; aJrmonikh`/ to; ejkmelev~, o{pw~ e[cei, skopei`n sumbevbhke pro;~ th;n tw`n
ejnantivwn ajpergasivan:
(1.1) The first people to assume that the arts are like the senses seem to me to have perceived
not least their power to make judgements, by which we are naturally able to grasp opposites
equally in both cases. For this is what they have in common. But they differ as regards the goals
of their discrimination (1.2). For sense-perception exists no more for the discrimination of white
than of black, or of sweet than of bitter, or of soft and yielding than of hard and resisting, but it is
its task when it encounters each of these things to be moved by all and being moved to report the
experience to the understanding. (1.3) The arts, on the other hand, which are constituted through
the use of reason for the selection and adoption of what is appropriate, and the avoidance and
rejection of what is alien, contemplate the one class of objects for themselves and directly, and the
other class incidentally in order to avoid them. For in fact the art of medicine has incidentally
studied the nature of disease, and the art of harmony that of discord, in order to produce their
opposites. (Demetr. 1.1–3)
eJkatevrw/: ejn eJkatevrw/ Reiske.
diagnwvsei Anon: diavgnwsi~.
kinei`sqai: kinei`sqai kai; pavnta kinei`n pro;~ to; fronou`n ajnafevrousan all mss. except P,
which has it in the margin.
Both the senses and the arts have the power to make distinctions, though they
differ in the goals to which such distinctions are put once made. The senses are
passive; they simply respond to whatever impulses happen to come to them and
report the experience to the mind.6 The arts on the other hand – or rather their
practitioners – are active; while they notice everything, they employ reason to
determine how they should react to different objects; this discrimination can allow
the practitioners of the arts to react appropriately to both good examples and bad
examples and gain benefit from both.
6
 Lying behind this is the common ancient belief, derived from the atomists, that the senses or
sense-perception operated by the impact of ‘images’ (ei[dwla) emanating from the object on the
sense organs (see Lucretius 4.26–215). E.g. ‘It is proper to the senses (aijsqhvsew~) merely to
perceive (ajntilambavnesqai) what is present and stimulates it (kinou`nto~), such as colour, but
not to discriminate that the thing here is one thing and the thing there another’ (Sextos Em-
peirikos, Adv. math. 7.210); cf. Diog. Laert. 10.31: ‘For every ai[sqhsi~, Epikouros says, is
irrational and receptive of no memory; for when it is stimulated (kinhqei`sa) either by itself or
something else it cannot add or take anything away’. For more details, see e.g. RIST (1972) 14–40
and 74–99; TAYLOR (1980); GODWIN (1986) 90–92.
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Much of this is similar to the Perikles and Fabius prologue, which had also
begun with a contrast between the senses and reason: our physical senses, Plutarch
had argued, must receive every stimulus that strikes them, whereas with our mind
we can choose to concentrate only on objects which are beneficial to us – such as
the virtuous deeds of others;7 indeed when we look at the work of craftsmen, we
admire it but do not want to imitate it; but when we turn our mind to the
contemplation of virtuous deeds – especially the virtuous deeds of the great men
of history – we both admire them and desire to imitate them, thus becoming better
people (Per. 1–2). The two prologues share the notion that the use of reason
allows one to be selective and to concentrate on beneficial stimuli, and the
assumption that virtue is an art.8 But in the Perikles and Fabius the arts had been
subdivided into two contrasting types: the art of virtue, the products of which
encourage both admiration and imitation, and the other arts (e.g. sculpture and
music), the products of which encourage mere admiration, but do not benefit the
observer. In the Demetrios and Antony, however, Plutarch chooses to align the
arts with reason (speaking of ‘the arts which are constituted through the use of
reason’), and mentions medicine and music as parallels with the art of virtue – a
significant choice, as we shall see. The practitioners of both, he argues, can learn
from looking at bad examples to produce their opposites.9
The notion, however, that one might usefully study what is harmful as well as
what is beneficial is not present in the Perikles and Fabius or in earlier prologues.
But the other similarities with the Perikles and Fabius prologue emphasise the
continuity of vision in both prologues concerning the moral benefit of reading the
Lives: this may be a new approach, but the same moral aims and assumptions
which have gone into the whole programme of the Lives until this point are
present.10 But in fact the concept of the educative value of looking at bad
examples would have been familiar to Plutarch’s readers and was one widely
recognised in antiquity.11 Indeed, Plutarch’s text On lack of anger, which proba-
7
 th`/ me;n ga;r aijsqhvsei, kata; pavqo~ th;n plhgh;n ajntilambanomevnh/ tw`n prostugcanovntwn,
i[sw~ ajnavgkh pa`n to; fainovmenon, a[n te crhvsimon a[n t∆ a[crhston h\/, qewrei`n, tw`/ nw`/ d∆ e{kasto~,
eij bouvloito, crh`sqai kai; trevpein eJauto;n ajei; kai; metabavllein rJa`/sta pro;~ to; dokou`n
pevfuken … tau`ta d∆ e[stin ejn toi`~ ajp∆ ajreth`~ e[rgoi~, a} kai; zh`lovn tina kai; proqumivan ajgwgo;n
eij~ mivmhsin ejmpoiei` toi`~ iJstorhvsasin (Per. 1.3–4).
8
 On virtue as an art in Plato, see e.g. GOULD (1955) 3–46.
9
 pro;~ th;n tw`n ejnantivwn ajpergasivan. ajpergasiva (‘production’) is a word often used of the
arts: e.g. Plato, Prot. 312d, pro;~ th;n ajpergasivan th;n tw`n eijkovnwn (of painters).
10
 The recurrence of Ismenias the Theban in both prologues (Demetr. 1.6; Per. 1.5) has a
similar effect. For a comparable revising of the programme offered in earlier pairs in the prologue
to a late pair, see Thes. 1, with the helpful comments of PELLING (1999b) 431–432 [a longer
version can be found in repr. (2002a) 171–173] and (2002a) 277.
11
 Cf. in particular Livy, e.g. Preface 10 (with CHAPLIN 2000) and Valerius Maximus, who
includes a book on vices to be avoided (Book Nine) in his Memorable Deeds and Sayings; cf. also
Diog. Laert. 1.103 and Clem. Alex. Paid. III 41–45 (278–281 Potterius) [‘  {Oti aiJ eijkovne~ kai; ta;
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bly predates all of the Parallel Lives, shows just this process at work:12 the speaker
Fundanus describes how looking at the ill-effects of anger in others encouraged
him to control his own (e.g. 455e–456b).13 Significantly, Fundanus invokes the
same example that Plutarch invokes in the Demetrios and Antony prologue (1.5),
that of the Spartans displaying drunk helots to their youths in order to teach them
the dangers of drunkenness (455e).
But it is important to note that in the Demetrios and Antony prologue Plutarch
stresses the ‘incidental’ nature of this contemplation of bad examples: the arts – or
people who wish to practise the arts – study good examples on purpose, but bad
examples ‘incidentally’ (kata; sumbebhkov~). The idea of incidentality is important
enough to repeat in the next sentence: ‘it has happened’ (sumbevbhke) that doctors
and musicians study sickness and discord. The point is perhaps that negative
examples should not be considered interesting in themselves; rather, those exam-
ples of bad behaviour, poor health or unharmonious sounds which – just like the
stimuli which impinge on our senses – ‘come our way’ (ejntugcavnousan) can,
with correct observation, logical thinking and discrimination, be used for our
benefit. Bad examples can be valuable, but are not to be sought out as of them-
selves absorbing or titillating. This is a point to which Plutarch will return in 1.5.
Having made the point that negative examples can be helpful, Plutarch now
turns to the study of what he terms the ‘the most perfect arts of all’, that is, the
virtues. He has already made the point that the arts, like the senses, can distinguish
good from bad, but they differ from the senses ‘as regards the goals (tevlh) of such
discernment’ (1.1). Here the arts of virtue are called telewvtatai, that is, not only
‘most perfect’ but also most efficacious in achieving the worthwhile goal (tevlo~)
of moral improvement:
(1.4) ai{ te pasw`n telewvtatai tecnw`n, swfrosuvnh kai; dikaiosuvnh kai; frovnhsi~, ouj
kalw`n movnon kai; dikaivwn kai; wjfelivmwn, ajlla; kai; blaberw`n kai; aijscrw`n kai; ajdivkwn
krivsei~ ou\sai, th;n ajpeiriva/ tw`n kakw`n kallwpizomevnhn ajkakivan oujk ejpainou`sin, ajll∆
ajbelterivan hJgou`ntai kai; a[gnoian w|n mavlista ginwvskein proshvkei tou;~ ojrqw`~ biwsomevnou~.
(1.4) And the most perfect arts of all – temperance, justice, and wisdom – do not consist of
judgements about fine, just and useful things alone, but also about harmful, shameful and unjust
things. So these arts do not praise the innocence that plumes itself in its inexperience of evil, but
they consider it silliness and ignorance of what those who intend to live correctly ought to know.
(Demetr. 1.4)
uJpodeivgmata mevgiston mevro~ th`~ ojrqh`~ eijsi didaskaliva~’], which both have reference to the
Spartan practice (41–2). STADTER (1997) 66–70 and (2000) 498–9 points to Cicero, De Offic.
3.73–88 and Seneca, Ep. 94.62–66 (where Seneca uses Alexander, Gn. Pompey, Caesar and
Marius as examples of men not to imitate or envy, men driven by greed into constant activity).
The illustration of the teacher taking his pupils to see a bad flute-player (Demetr. 1.6) is also used
at Phil. Apoll. 5.32.
12
 Peri; ajorghsiva~ (De cohibenda ira). For the date, see JONES (1966) 61–62. On this text, cf.
e.g. INGENKAMP (1971) 14–26; BECCHI (1990).
13
 See STADTER (2000) 500–505; (2003/4) 90–91.
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An understanding of vice, then, is essential if one is to reach moral maturity. The
relevance of the argument to a reading of the Lives, with their especially moral,
character-forming purpose, is now becoming clearer.
There is almost certainly an allusion here to a passage of Plato. In Book 3 of the
Republic Plato had argued for the damaging effects of having bad behaviour
portrayed in poetry – damaging both for the listener, especially if he is young
(401b–c), and for the reciter or actor, especially if he ‘imitates’ bad men in a
dramatic presentation (396c–e).14 Plutarch, in his treatise How a young man
should listen to poems, argues at length, implicitly against Plato in the Republic,
that reading about bad behaviour need not be damaging.15 His lengthy justification
in the Demetrios and Antony of the utility of reading about bad behaviour engages
much more directly with Plato’s arguments, though once again the latter is not
named. Although the best doctor, Plato had argued, would be one who had treated
and indeed suffered the most diseases, this does not apply to the good judge:
ajll∆ a[peiron aujth;n kai; ajkevraion dei` kakw`n hjqw`n nevan ou\san gegonevnai, eij mevllei kalh;
kajgaqh; ou\sa krivnein uJgiw`~ ta; divkaia.16 dio; dh; kai; eujhvqei~ nevoi o[nte~ oiJ ejpieikei`~ faivnon-
tai kai; eujexapavthtoi uJpo; tw`n ajdivkwn, a{te oujk e[conte~ ejn eJautoi`~ paradeivgmata oJmoiopaqh`
toi`~ ponhroi`~.
But his soul should, when young, be inexperienced and uncontaminated by bad characters, if
it is going to be fair and good and make healthy judgements about what is correct. So it is that
noble people, when young, seem simple-minded and are easily deceived by the wicked, because
they do not have within themselves examples compatible with anything which is bad. (Republic
409a–b)
It is clear that Plutarch is responding to this passage: reading about bad behaviour,
can – despite Plato – be beneficial. In fact, verbal correspondences are so striking
that the reader is probably expected to recognise the Platonic original. In particu-
lar, Plutarch’s argument in 1.4 that ‘experience’ of evil is necessary for correct
action seems designed to counter Plato’s argument that, as a young man, the good
judge should have no ‘experience’ of evil. Plutarch’s ‘examples [consisting] of the
Lives’ (ta; paradeivgmata tw`n bivwn) probably picks up paradeivgmata in Plato:
noble people do not have examples of bad behaviour ‘within themselves’ – that is,
they do not have direct knowledge of evil – but they need to observe examples of
such behaviour, which Plutarch will provide through his literary programme.
14 Rather than just narrates their actions. The one apparent exception to Plato’s ban on the
imitation of bad men in poetry is when it is done in fun (paidia`~ cavrin: Rep. 396e). Plato may
have had comedy in mind: see Laws 816d–e (p. 277 below).
15
 It is difficult to date the How a young man should listen to poems (Pw`~ dei` to;n nevon
poihmavtwn ajkouvein); it may predate the Demetrios and Antony, but this is not at all certain: see
Jones (1966) 71 [= repr. (1995) 117]. On this text, see HILLYARD (1981); SCHENKEVELD (1982); LA
MATINA (1991); VALGIGLIO (1991); DÍAZ LAVADO (1996); WHITMARSH (2001) 48–54 and 91–96.
16
 Cf. Plut.: ouj kalw`n movnon kai; dikaivwn kai; wjfelivmwn, ajlla; kai; blaberw`n kai; aijscrw`n
kai; ajdivkwn krivsei~ ou\sai.
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Furthermore, Plutarch’s choice of the arts of medicine and music in 1.3 as
exemplars of the way in which bad examples can be used is also particularly
significant: both music and medicine had been discussed at length in the preceding
chapters in Republic Book 3.
Plato goes on to argue that the good judge should gain understanding of evil
only later in life, and this understanding should be ‘through knowledge, not
through his own experience’ (ejpisthvmh/, oujk ejmpeiriva/ oijkeiva/ kecrhmevnon).17
For Plato, experience of evil is here a bad thing and potentially corrupting; for
Plutarch experience is redefined positively as experience gained through study, a
helpful and necessary aid to moral maturity, and is not so far removed from what
Plato meant by knowledge (cf. 409d). For Plutarch, then, although ‘imitating’ bad
men – in the sense of modelling one’s life on them – is undesirable, having
experience of them through study may be beneficial (cf. 1.6: ãh[n tÃina kai; tw`n
fauvlwn pei`ran lambavnwsin).18 The disagreement with Plato might, of course, be
partly explained by the age of the audience envisaged. Plato was discussing the
education of the young, the future guardians. Likewise in the How a young man
should listen to poems Plutarch too is talking about the young – children or
teenagers – a fact which may explain the rather utilitarian approach to literature
taken there, which sidelines the aesthetic value of poetry and is concerned only
with its potential for improving or corrupting its young readers. But in the Lives,
Plutarch imagines a mature reader, able to grapple with the realities of history and
with the moral problems that these realities raise. Hence the stress here on the
reader’s judgement or discrimination (krisis) and the ability to act on it.
At this point Plutarch himself cites a negative example: we should not be like
the Spartans who used to make their helots drunk in order to teach the young the
dangers of drunkenness, an act which Plutarch characterises as ‘hardly humane or
the act of a statesman’ (ouj panu; filavnqrwpon oujde; politikhvn). The reference to
the Spartans and their helots is particularly effective. Plainly this is a stock
example, often invoked to illustrate that one can learn from negative examples.19
But Plutarch here takes the Spartan practice as itself a negative example from
which to learn – one should not be like the Spartans, seeking out and creating
negative examples by humiliating others. On the one hand, then, this is clever and
self-reflexive argumentation: a negative example to illustrate how not to use
negative examples. On the other hand, it also introduces an example drawn from
17
 Cf. Plut.: th;n ajpeiriva/ tw`n kakw`n kallwpizomevnhn ajkakivan oujk ejpainou`sin and tw`n de;
kecrhmevnwn ajskeptovteron auJtoi`~.
18
 For other tacit corrections of Plato, see DUFF (1999) 43–45 (on Per. 1–2), 213 and 266 (on
De Cohib. Ira 457b–c).
19
 The Spartan practice as admirable: Plato Laws 816d–e (though helots not explicitly
mentioned: see below, p. 277); Plut. De Cohib. Ira 455e; ps?-Plut. Inst. Lac. 239a; Diog. Laert.
1.103; Clem. Alex. Paid. III 41–2 (278–281 Potterius). The Spartan practice itself criticised: Plut.
Lyk. 28.8–12. On these passages, see DUCAT (1990) 115–117.
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history, and makes smoother the transition from general reflexion on the value of
negative examples to an argument about Plutarch’s own literary programme in the
Lives and the potential of bad examples drawn from history. Furthermore, by
rejecting the Spartan practice, Plutarch also succeeds in constructing both himself
and his readers as humane and sympathetic to the plights and weakness of others,
a key virtue in Plutarch’s oeuvre and a key plank in his own self-presentation.
Such philanthropia, given its most clear and famous statement in Kimon 2.2–3, is
what will condition Plutarch’s attitude to the failings of his subjects, especially of
Demetrios and Antony, who fail in grand fashion, and is assumed of his readers.20
But the reference to the helots has a further function: it alludes to another
passage of Plato from Book 7 of the Laws. The subject is the education of the
young. After dealing at length with the subject of dance, Plato’s protagonist turns
briefly to drama. Comedy,21 he argues, should be allowed in the ideal state: ‘For it
is impossible to learn the serious without the ridiculous or any one of a set of
opposites without the other’ (816d–e). ‘It is for this reason’, he goes on, ‘that one
should learn these things too (ie. how people can engage in ridiculous behaviour)
in order never through ignorance to do anything ridiculous, when one should not’.
Such ‘mimicry’ (ie. comic acting) should not be undertaken by citizens but should
be imposed on slaves and foreigners working for pay (816e).22 The Laws, then,
provided a justification for the use of negative examples; Plutarch’s mention of
helots is probably intended to recall this passage.23 But whereas Plato had ap-
proved the imposition of degrading behaviour on slaves in order to teach young
citizens how not to act, Plutarch explicitly disapproves. He thus implicitly corrects
Plato in one of his harsher pronouncements: the latter was right in seeing the value
of looking at bad behaviour but not right in his inhumane treatment of the weak.24
20
 On the importance of the virtue of filanqrwpiva for Plutarch, see MARTIN (1961). On
Plutarch’s persona of filanqrwpiva in the Lives, and the relevance of Kim. 2.2–3, see DUFF
(1999) 55–62.
21
 What he calls ‘the behaviour of base bodies and ideas and of those engaged in laughable
comic-acting, in speech and song and dance and all the representations of all these things by the
comedians’ (816d).
22
 a[neu ga;r geloivwn ta; spoudai`a kai; pavntwn tw`n ejnantivwn ta; ejnantiva maqei`n me;n ouj
dunatovn, eij mevllei ti~ frovnimo~ e[sesqai, poiei`n de; oujk au\ dunato;n ajmfovtera, ei[ ti~ au\
mevllei kai; smikro;n ajreth`~ meqevxein, ajlla; aujtw`n e{neka touvtwn kai; manqavnein aujta; dei`, tou`
mhv pote di∆ a[gnoian dra`n h] levgein o{sa geloi`a, mhde;n devon, douvloi~ de; ta; toiau`ta kai; xevnoi~
ejmmivsqoi~ prostavttein mimei`sqai … Cf. Rep. 396e.
23
 Plato may in fact have had the Spartan custom in mind, as Plutarch may have seen; he had
already referred to helots at 776c and 777b–c.
24
 Plato goes on to discuss tragedy, which will be allowed if it will teach what the rulers want
to be taught. He imagines the rulers addressing the tragedians and saying ‘… we are the poets of
the fairest and best possible tragedy; for our whole state is an imitation of the fairest and best life
(mivmhsi~ tou` kallivstou kai; ajrivstou bivou), which is in reality – so we at least assert – the truest
tragedy’ (817b).
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If Plato’s suggestion for the way one might learn from negative examples was
too harsh, then how should one use them? Plutarch continues:
(1.5) tw`n de; kecrhmevnwn ajskeptovteron auJtoi`~ kai; gegonovtwn ejn ejxousivai~ kai; pravgmasi
megavloi~ ejpifanw`n eij~ kakivan ouj cei`ron i[sw~ ejsti; suzugivan mivan h]] duvo parembalei`n eij~ ta;
paradeivgmata tw`n bivwn, oujk ejfæ hJdonh/ `ma; Diva kai; diagwgh`/ tw`n ejntugcanovntwn poikivllonta~
th;n grafhvn, (1.6) ajll∆ w{sper ∆Ismhniva~ oJ Qhbai`o~ ejpideiknuvmeno~ toi`~ maqhtai`~ kai; tou;~ eu\ kai;
tou;~ kakw`~ aujlou`nta~ eijwvqei levgein “ou{tw~ aujlei`n dei” kai; pavlin “ou{tw~ aujlei`n ouj dei”, oJ d∆
∆Antigeneivda~ kai; h{dion w[/eto tw`n ajgaqw`n ajkroa`sqai tou;~ nevou~ aujlhtw`n, ãh[n tÃina kai; tw`n
fauvlwn pei`ran lambavnwsin, ou{tw~ moi dokou`men hJmei`~ proqumovteroi tw`n beltiovnwn e[sesqai
kai; qeatai; kai; mimhtai; bivwn, eij mhde; tw`n fauvlwn kai; yegomevnwn ajnistorhvtw~ e[coimen.
(1.5) Perhaps, however, it is not such a bad idea for me to insert into the paradigms of my
Lives one or two pairs of men who conducted themselves in a rather [or more] unreflecting way
and who became in their positions of power and amid great affairs renowned for their vice – not
by Zeus in order to please and distract readers by varying my writing, (1.6) but just as Ismenias
the Theban used to point out to his pupils both those who played the pipes well and those who
played badly, saying ‘That is how you should play’ and ‘That is how you should not play’, and
just as Antigeneidas thought that the young listened with more pleasure to the good pipers if they
had experienced a bad player too, in the same way I think we will be more enthusiastic both as
spectators and imitators of the better Lives, if we do not leave unexamined the base and the
castigated. (Demetr. 1.5–6)
ãh[n tÃina Reiske: i{na.
While humiliating the weak is not humane nor good statesmanship, reading about
the lives of the flawed characters of history can be helpful. This, like the observa-
tion of poor flute players, is acceptable because it does not involve humiliating the
objects of investigation. Such negative examples can be introduced to the mature
reader because – to return to the language of the earlier sentences – through the use
of reason such a reader can not only perceive good and bad, virtue and vice, but
can also discriminate as regards the appropriate reaction to each. The mature
reader should, as Plutarch said earlier, not be in a state of innocence or ignorance
about vice, but, through studying examples drawn from history of men ‘renowned
for vice’, should learn the better to avoid it.
 But if Plutarch is disagreeing with Plato here, he is equally at pains to
emphasise that the purpose of narrating the Lives of such less-than-perfect-men is
not at all the pleasure of the casual reader, who might take pleasure in spicy,
exciting tales (1.5). Of course, such a claim does not rule out the possibility that
the Lives which follow might indeed be exciting and emotive; indeed, it might be
thought to encourage the expectation.25 But the point is that the pleasure that
arises from such narrative is not to be seen as the goal for the serious reader.
There is thus an implied contrast here between pleasure and utility – a standard
one in historiographical theory.26 There is also an implied contrast between casual
25
 The Demetrios and Antony is often considered one of the most exciting and moving of all
Plutarch’s texts: e.g. RUSSELL (1973) 135–142; LAMBERTON (2001) 130–142.
26
 E.g. FORNARA (1983) 104–134; GENTILI / CERRI (1988) 10–33.
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readers and the ideal, serious reader.27 The verb ejntugcavnw is standard Greek for
‘read’. So tw`n ejntugcanovntwn in 1.5 means in the first place simply ‘readers’.28
But the participle of ejntugcavnw had been used earlier in the prologue to refer to
the senses which must respond passively to any data which they ‘happen to come
across’ (ejntugcavnousan). So there is probably a sense here of ‘those who happen
to come across’ his work, that is, casual, chance readers. Such casual readers, are
aligned with the physical senses, and simply respond passively to stimuli. Serious
readers, on the other hand, are aligned with the practitioners of the arts, and
actively use reason to think about and consider what they are reading; they can
benefit, just as much as serious students of music or medicine can, from a self-
conscious study of bad examples. They will not actively seek them out for any
pleasure or titillation which such bad examples might provide, but will attempt to
gain benefit from the examples that they happen to come across (the point of kata;
sumbebhko;~ in 1.3). In making a distinction between the casual reader and the
serious, discriminating reader, and in aligning the former with the physical senses
and the latter with reason, Plutarch is of course both complimenting his readers
and creating a bond of shared expectations and values between writer and recipi-
ent – ‘You are not the sort of readers to take pleasure from reading about the bad
behaviour of the great – nor am I the sort of frivolous writer who would aim solely
at your pleasure’.29
Plutarch is thus positioning not only his ideal reader in relation to other less
serious readers, but also himself in relation to other writers. Claims that rival
historians indulged in sensationalist narrative either lacking in moral content or
transgressing the basic rules of historical accuracy are common-place in the
27
 PELLING (2002b) 275–6, who points also to a similar implied contrast in Nik. 1.1, where less
than ideal readers are called tou;~ ejntugcavnonta~ toi`~ gravmmasi touvtoi~, and in Alex. 1–3, where
some readers might ‘quibble’ (sukofantei`n) that the narrator will not give an exhaustive military
account.
28
 In fact ejntugcavnw can also mean ‘meet’, and there is probably a sense of that here too:
‘those who meet (through reading the Lives)’ such notorious men of the past. This might be taken
is a subtle claim for the vividness of the Lives, comparable to the description in the prologue to
the Aemilius and Timoleon of the act of reading the Lives as being like ‘spending time and living’
with the heroes of the past, ‘receiving and inviting each of these men in turn when they visit us
through history’ (Aem. 1.2).
29 See PELLING (2002b) passim for ways in which Plutarch constructs both his own persona
and his audience, especially in the prologues and synkriseis, suggesting complicity of attitudes
and purpose (cf. also STADTER 1988). The use of first-person plural verbs here (hJmei`~ …
hJgouvmeqa … ou{tw~ moi dokou`men hJmei`~ …), as in other formal prologues (e.g. Per. 2.3:
ajgapw`men … boulovmeqa …; Aem. 1, Alex. 1 and Nik.1 passim) and in many formal synkriseis
(e.g. Lys.-Sulla 5.6; Phil.-Flam. 3–5; Ages.-Pomp. 1.1), also has the effect of suggesting a bond of
common attitudes and endeavour between author and reader (see below, p. 286). As PHILIP
STADTER has pointed out to me, ou{tw~ moi dokou`men hJmei`~ in 1.5 combines both first person
singulars and plurals: this cannot be considered as a false plural. On such inclusive plurals, see
DUFF (1999) 268–269, 286, 299; PELLING (2002b) 273–4.
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ancient world, as are claims of a distinction between serious readers and frivolous
readers. Polybios famously attacked Phylarchos for what he presented as just such
sensationalist, emotive narrative (2.56), comparing him to his discredit to a tragic
poet, and appealing to a distinction between frivolous readers (tou;~ ejntugcavnon-
ta~ … tou;~ ajkouvonta~) and serious readers (tou;~ filomaqou`nta~).30 Plutarch
himself sometimes elsewhere categorises rival historians with terms such as
‘tragic’ or ‘dramatic’,31 though such claims generally serve to differentiate Plutar-
ch’s own narrative from theirs on the grounds of a supposed greater objectivity or
restraint or a higher moral purpose. Similarly Plutarch’s explicit rejection of
pleasure as a goal here serves to highlight the presence of an educational element
in his narration of flawed individuals, rather than as a total denial that such
narratives will be enjoyable – nor indeed as a total rejection of the tragic.
Indeed, when Plutarch mentions Demetrios and Antony by name it is with
reference to another Platonic passage and, implicitly, to the notion of the tragic:
(1.7) Perievxei dh; tou`to to; biblivon to;n Dhmhtrivou tou` Poliorkhtou` bivon kai; to;n ∆Antwn-
ivou tou` aujtokravtoro~, ajndrw`n mavlista dh; tw/` Plavtwni marturhsavntwn, o{ti kai; kakiva~
megavla~ w{sper ajreta;~ aiJ megavlai fuvsei~ ejkfevrousi. (1.8) genovmenoi d∆ oJmoivw~ ejrwtikoi;
potikoi; stratiwtikoi; megalovdwroi polutelei`~ uJbristaiv, kai; ta;~ kata; tuvchn oJmoiovthta~
ajkolouvqou~ e[scon. ouj ga;r movnon ejn tw`/ loipw`/ bivw/ megavla me;n katorqou`nte~, megavla de;
sfallovmenoi, pleivstwn d∆ ejpikratou`nte~, plei`sta d∆ ajpobavllonte~, ajprosdokhvtw~ de; ptaivon-
te~, ajnelpivstw~ de; pavlin ajnafevronte~ dietevlesan, ajlla; kai; katevstreyen oJ me;n aJlou;~ uJpo;
tw`n polemivwn, oJ d∆ e[ggista tou` paqei`n tou`to genovmeno~.
(1.7) This book will contain the life of Demetrios the Besieger and that of Antony the
Imperator, men who most bore witness to Plato’s assertion that great natures produce great vices
as well as great virtues. (1.8) Both were similarly given to love and drink, were soldierly,
munificent, extravagant and hubristic; and they had resultant similarities in fortune. For it was not
just that in the rest of their lives they continually had great successes and great failures, huge
conquests and huge losses, unexpected failures and unexpected recoveries, but also that one
overturned his life after being captured by the enemy, the other after coming very near to
suffering this fate. (Demetr. 1.7–8)
to;n ∆Antwnivou Ziegler: ∆Antwnivou.
potikoi; I: politikoi;.
The technique is subtle: Plutarch follows his disagreement with Plato over the
value of bad examples with an explicit quotation of him. The reference is to a
passage in Book 6 of the Republic (491b–495b), to which Plutarch alludes
30
 Cf. 7.7.8 (kai; ga;r toi`~ filhkovoi~ hJdivwn ou|to~ kai; toi`~ filomaqou`si tw`/ panti; crh-
simwvtero~); 11.19.a2 (tou;~ ajkouvonta~ … tou;~ filomaqou`nta~).
31
 E.g. Theopompos: Dem. 21.2; Douris of Samos: Per. 28.2; Phylarchos: Them 32.4. There
was almost certainly no school of ‘tragic history’, as was once believed: accusations of writing in
a tragic way were stock ammunition to use in attacking rivals. On the whole issue of the so-called
‘tragic history’, see WALBANK (1938; 1960); KEBRIC (1977) 14–18; SACKS (1981) 144–170;
FORNARA (1983) 120–134; GENTILI / CERRI (1988) 14–33.
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frequently elsewhere in the Lives.32 Plato had argued that men with great potential
would turn out either very good, if they receive the appropriate education and
grow up in a suitable environment, or very bad, if they do not. Plutarch, both here
and in his other references to this passage, is rather more ambiguous: men of great
potential produce ‘great vices as well as great virtues’. The idea is presumably that
men with such great potential may produce great virtues under some circumstanc-
es and great vices under others; the possibility is left open that great vices and
great virtues may coexist in the same man at the same time. Plutarch may then be
revising Plato’s position, which was rather two-dimensional, and hinting at a more
subtle and realistic moral vision, and one with more room for sympathetic in-
volvement and understanding.33 He is, then, once again engaged in a dialogue
with Plato: citing him – and expecting the reader to notice the citation – while at
the same time reinterpreting him.
Plutarch goes on to list some of the shared characteristics of the two men
whose Lives will follow – a common feature of the ‘formal prologues’:34 ‘Both
were similarly given to love and drink, were soldierly, munificent, extravagant
and hubristic; and they had resultant similarities in fortune’. The division of a
man’s Life into two categories: i) character or moral qualities and ii) fortune,
success or circumstances of life is a common one in Plutarch and in ancient
thought generally.35 In terms of success and circumstance, the stress here is both
on the greatness of the two men – as is fitting for men introduced as ‘great natures’
– and on the vagaries of their fortune: they stumble (ptaivonte~), recover (ajnaf-
evronte~) and finally ‘overturn’ (katevstreyen) their life.36 The verb katastrevfw
(sc. bivon) is acceptable Greek in Plutarch’s time for ‘die’.37 But katevstreyen is
32
 See DUFF (1999) 47–49.
33
 Notably, Plutarch does not raise the issue here of education: while education is important
in determining a man’s moral, as well as practical, success (e.g PELLING 1989; SWAIN 1989, 62–66;
1990; 1996, 140–144 ) it is not a major issue in the Demetrios and Antony.
34
 The term was coined by STADTER (1988) to designate prologues which introduce both Lives
of the pair, rather than just the first, and thus mirror the ‘formal synkrisis’ at the end.
35
 The two can be seen as working together as here, or opposed: ie. that success or failure
either did or did not reflect the character or virtue either of an individual (e.g. Alexander) or of a
people (e.g. the Romans). See OAKLEY (1997–) note on Livy 7.34.6 and 9.17.1–19.17. This is a
common theme in rhetoric and is seen at its most spectacular in Plutarch’s On the fortune or
virtue of Romans and On the fortune of virtue or Alexander, and in the formal synkriseis (cf. DUFF
1999, 263).
36
 The vicissitudes of fortune is a theme common to both Lives and explicitly stated in the
first line of the synkrisis (Demeter.-Ant. 1.1).
37
 ejn tw`/ loipw/` bivw/ at the start of the phrase ensures that the sense ‘end one’s life’ is
prominent (as also in Them. 31.6 and Herodian 5.8.10: ∆Antwni`no~ me;n ou\n ej~ e{kton e[to~
ejlavsa~ th`~ basileiva~ kai; crhsavmeno~ tw`/ proeirhmevnw/ bivw/, ou{tw~ a{ma th`/ mhtri; katevstrey-
en). There is thus in Demetr. 1.8 a play on the meaning of life, as both physical and literary, life
and Life. Such puns on bivo~ are not uncommon: e.g. Aem. 1.1; Tim. 15.11; probably Mul. Virt.
243b. For katastevfw without bivon, cf. Arrian, Anab. 7.3.1.
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plainly chosen here for its continuing of the notion of the ups-and-downs (ajna- …
kata-) of their fortune. These ups and downs, the great successes and great
failures of Demetrios and Antony, are seen as resulting from their character: this is
the force of ajkolouvqou~ (‘following on, resultant’).
But what of their character? It is important to note that what is envisaged as
negative has shifted as this passage proceeds. At the start of the passage, it is
aesthetic – the sights or tastes which the senses are forced to accept even if they
are unpleasing. Then it is practical – bad flute players, bad doctors: there is no
suggestion that such men are morally bad, merely bad players or bad doctors. The
allusion to the last passage of Plato introduces the notion of moral badness or
goodness: these men are introduced as ‘notorious for their vice (kakiva)’, and
‘base and castigated’, and as confirming Plato’s doctrine about ‘great vices and
great virtues’. There is probably an element of both senses, practical and moral,
here: Demetrios and Antony are to be seen as men who failed, who were bad at the
business of living – examples, like the drunken helots, of incompetence and
foolishness but for whom a civilised man still feels pity and understanding. Indeed
in the body of the two Lives themselves Plutarch does not present Demetrios and
Antony as simple paradigms of vice; they are shown certainly to be flawed
individuals, but as CHRISTOPHER PELLING has emphasised the tone, especially in the
Antony, is one of understanding, even admiration for their good qualities and for
that quality of greatness which marks both their lives, while at the same time of
regret and sympathy for their weaknesses and ultimate failures.38
The list of adjectives with which Demetrios and Antony are described in the
prologue seems to support this reading. Although taken together the picture is
certainly rather negative, most of the qualities mentioned (e.g. stratiwtikoiv,
megalovdwroi) are not morally wrong in themselves, though it is easy to see how
they can become so when taken to an extreme. Take the term stratiwtikoiv, which
perhaps implies a soldier’s bluffness, even roughness, and an ability to mingle
with the common-soldiers, to win their trust, to bear their hardships;39 combined
with ejrwtikoi; potikoiv there might be a sense of the commander’s ability to
38 PELLING (1980) 138 [= repr. (1995) 149–150; repr. 2002a, 105–106]; IDEM (1988b) 10–
18. Cf. also the brief remarks of CANDAU MORÓN (1999).
39
 stratiwtikov~ is very rarely used of individuals in Plutarch. Caesar applies it self-
deprecatingly to himself: his diction is that of a stratiwtikov~ not an orator (Caes. 3.4); Plutarch
puts down Parmenion’s inability to follow his doctor’s diet as resulting from his being nevo~ kai;
stratiwtikov~ (Alex. 72.2); Philopoimen, who, Plutarch emphasises, was much better suited for
life as a soldier than a commander, is told that the body and life of an athlete are very different
from those of a stratiwtikov~ (Phil. 3.4). The term is plainly not critical in itself: but seems to
carry implications of excessive commitment to the military or a certain boorishness or boisterous-
ness. When Cato the Elder praises his father wJ~ ajgaqo;n a[ndra kai; stratiwtikovn (Cato Maj. 1.1)
the term reflects Cato’s own pose of rejection of cultural sophistication in favour of a more
rugged militarism. The word is perhaps applied to Antony in Ant. 27.2 (see below and n. 43).
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carouse and drink with his men. Similarly, their extravagance and generosity are
qualities which cut both ways.40 With Demetrios, drinking and uncontrolled
sexual desires are treated as minor and endearing peccadillos at the start (e.g.
Demetr. 9.5–7; 19.4–10); Plutarch states explicitly that they did not detract from
his military abilities (2.3; 19.10; Demetr.-Ant. 3.1–3). As the Life progresses,
however, his sexual behaviour alienates allies (e.g. 23.4–24.5, his exploits on the
Athenian Akropolis) and in the end his drinking causes his own death (Demetr.
52.2–5). But in the Antony the positive, practical benefits of such behaviour –
playing the rugged soldier, drinking with his men, assisting in their erotic esca-
pades and joking about his own, liberality – are brought out in an important
passage near the start of the Antony (4.1–7).41 This kind of thing is what will
contribute in large part to Antony’s military success (e.g. Ant. 17.5), although
such behaviour will also contribute to his failures;42 this is clearest at Ant. 27.2,
where Kleopatra correctly ‘saw in him a lot of the common soldier’ (polu; … to;
stratiwtiko;n … kai; bavnauson), and was able to adjust her tactics of seduction
accordingly.43 Only the final adjective, uJbristaiv, is unequivocally negative,
suggesting excessive self-regard, a disdain for others, perhaps violence.44
Moral failings combined with greatness, sudden and unexpected changes of
fortune, hybris, tyche, suffering (paqei`n): the language of 1.8, finally, lends
support to the theories of those who wish to see in the Demetrios and Antony a
tragic structure and its subjects as tragic heroes.45 It has long been recognised that
40
 megalovdwroi (lit. ‘great givers’) is of course an adjective entirely suitable for ‘great
natures’ like Demetrios and Antony. For their generosity, cf. also e.g. Demetr. 6.5; Ant. 6.5.
41
 As often the second Life of a pair complicates a more simple moral schema set out in the
first: see PELLING (1986) 94–96 [= repr. (2002a) 357–359]; (1988b) 23–26.
42
 As Plutarch puts it, commenting on Antony’s liberality and open-handed behaviour to his
friends, ‘it provided a brilliant start to his growing strength, and when he had become great lifted
his power to yet greater heights, though this was being overturned (ajnatrepomevnhn) by countless
faults besides’ (Ant. 4.6). See PELLING (1988b) notes ad loc.
43
 stratiwtikovn in Ant. 27.2 is Ziegler’s emendation for stratiwvthn. See PELLING (1988b)
notes ad loc.
44
 In fact, potikoiv is found in only one 14th cent. ms (I = Parisinus 1679, not collated by
ZIEGLER: see MANFREDINI 1995) and thence in the Iuntine edition, the editio princeps of the Lives;
the other mss have politikoiv. As PHILIP STADTER has pointed out to me, potikov~ is certainly a
Plutarchan word (e.g. Demetr. 36.6: oujk e[cein aujtw`/ to; sw`ma potikw`~; Alex. 4.7; De Is. et Osir.
352f; Quest. conv. 663c; 709b). A reference to drinking is suitable for both men, and coheres with
all the other terms mentioned. But politikoiv is not impossible and would form a neat pair with
stratiwtikoiv. If politikoiv were correct, then this list could even less be considered a list of
vices.
45
 See above note 5. A detailed treatment of the links between Plutarch’s Lives and tragedy as
a genre (rather than of particular Lives or particular tragedies) has not been attempted since DE
LACY (1952) and TAGLIASACCHI (1960), though a good starting point is now provided by PELLING
(2002a) 111, n. 27. Scattered discussions of individual Lives or themes can be found in RUSSELL
(1973) 123, 135; DI GREGORIO (1976) 166–173; PELLING (1980) 132 [= repr. (1995) 135–136; repr.
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there is a high concentration of metaphors from the tragic stage in these two Lives:
Demetrios is repeatedly called or compared to an actor, and terms such ‘tragic’
(tragikov~), ‘actor’ (uJpokrithv~), and ‘drama’ (dra`ma) occur repeatedly.46 For
example, when Demetrios’ troops begin to desert to Pyrrhos, he is described as
going to his tent (skhnhv: the word can also have connotations of the stage) ‘not
like a king but like an actor’ and putting on a dark cloak ‘instead of that tragic
costume’ (Demetr. 44.9).47 Such metaphors in Plutarch and more generally in this
period often express, as in this passage, the puncturing of over-blown and grandi-
ose self-regard.48 But stage terms are too common in the two Lives for this to be
their only implication. In the transition from the first Life to the second, Plutarch
makes explicit the dramatic mood of the two Lives: ‘Now that the Macedonian
play has been performed to the end, it is time to bring on the Roman too’ (Demetr.
53.10).49 And in the final words of the book as a whole, that is at the end of the
synkrisis (Demetr.-Ant. 6.4), Plutarch has Antony ‘making his exit’ (eJauto;n
ejxhvgagen).50 Such metaphors, combined with the great prominence given to the
role of fortune in the two Lives, especially in the Demetrios, where it builds him
up and ultimately casts him down, suggest that the Lives of the two men might
well be read as tragedies and their subjects as tragic heroes.51 The reader watches
helplessly as both men unwittingly work their own downfall.
A recognition of the tragic elements of the Demetrios and Antony is, of course,
not new. Indeed Shakespeare chose the Life of Antony as inspiration for one of his
(2002a) 97–98]; (1986) 91–92 [= repr. (2002a) 355]; (1988a) 273–4 [= repr. (2002a) 296–297];
(1988b) 21–25; (1992) 27–30 [= repr. (2002a) 130–132]; (1997) (1999a); (2002a) 97–98 esp. n.
27; MOSSMAN (1988); (1992) 100 and 103; (1997) 111–112; ANDREI (1989) 78–82; FRAZIER (1992)
4525–4528; BRAUND (1993; 1997); TITCHENER (1996); GUILLÉN SELFA (1997); ZADOROJNYI (1997);
CANDAU MORÓN (1999) 142–143; DUFF (1999) 41–42, 61–62, 69–70, 123–126, 221, 284; JOUAN
(2001). DI GREGORIO (1979; 1980) lists allusions to individual tragedies, though without discuss-
ing their function.
46
 E.g. Demter. 18.5; 25.9; 28.1; 34.4; 41.5–6; 44.9; 53.1; 53.10; Ant. 29.4; 45.4; 54.5;
Demetr.-Ant. 6.4. The tragic metaphors in the Demetrios almost certainly owe something to
Douris of Samos, an important source for this Life: SWEET (1951) 179–181; TAGLIASACCHI (1960);
KEBRIC (1977) 59–60; MASTROCINQUE (1979) 269–276; ANDREI (1989) 43–44, 47–48; AMANTANI
(1995) xxiii–xxiv. But their presence in the Antony too show that Plutarch did not merely
reproduce them unthinkingly from his source.
47
 It might be worth noticing in passing that this presentation of Demetrios as a tragic figure,
or as an actor in his own drama, plainly influenced Cavafy. In his poem entitled ÔO Basileu;~
Dhmhvtrio~ (published 1906), Cavafy chooses exactly that image, Demetrios’ changing of his
clothes like an actor leaving the stage, to sum up the man. In highlighting the tragic and the
theatrical aspects of Demetrios, Cavafy showed himself an insightful reader of Plutarch.
48
 For this aspect of Plutarch’s characterisation of Demetrios, cf. DUFF (1999) 116–118.
49
 Dihgwnismevnou de; tou` Makedwnikou` dravmato~, w{ra to; ÔRwmai>ko;n ejpeisagagei`n.
50
 On this final sentence of the synkrisis as providing a vision of Antony’s death as strikingly
at odds with that in the Life itself, see DUFF (1999) 279–281.
51
 See PELLING (1988b) 23–25; GUILLÉN SELFA (1997) 249.
285Plato, tragedy, the ideal reader and Plutarch’s Demetrios and Antony
own tragedies.52 But it is notable that such a reading is encouraged by the
language of the prologue. Perhaps we are meant to think specifically of Aristotle’s
Poetics: the ideal tragedy, according to Poetics 13, does not concern either a good
man or a bad man, but someone in between (oJ metaxu; … touvtwn): men of great
renown (ejpifanei`~ a[ndre~) who fall ‘not through vice and depravity’ but through
some mistake.53 Demetrios and Antony, then, although introduced initially as men
‘renowned for their vice’ (ejpifanw`n eij~ kakivan) are presented more like the great
characters of tragedy, men who – as Aristotle saw them – are neither very good
nor very bad but are shown passing from success to diaster.54 Plato had notorious-
ly criticised tragedy in Republic 10 on the grounds not only that it is a poor
imitation of reality but also that it corrupts the audience by appealing to their
emotions and encouraging the imitation of the bad behaviour presented on stage
(esp. Rep. 605a–608b).55 In the Laws, although he allowed it a place, tragedy is
still treated as dangerous and is only allowed if subject to censorship.56 Plutarch in
the How the young should listen to poems seems to accept the Platonic notion that
the bad behaviour presented in tragedy might corrupt the young: he argues at
length that children must be taught that not everything presented on the stage is
worthy of imitation. But it is significant that he does not go as far as rejecting
tragedy as a whole. In the Demetrios and Antony, on the other hand, Plutarch
implicitly rejects Plato’s crudely moralising criticisms of tragedy and assumes a
mature, discerning reader able to grapple with the moral challenges provided by
two such tragic figures.
In fact, this emphasis on the mature reader’s use of his or her own critical
faculties is central to Plutarch’s moral programme in the Lives more generally.
Recent studies of the moralism of the Lives have stressed the high demands these
texts make on the reader: there are very few examples of direct authorial com-
ment; the reader is expected to see for him or herself what is commendable or not.
Indeed, some pairs of Lives present figures who are morally very complex, neither
wholly virtuous nor without redeeming features – Lysander and Sulla, for exam-
ple, or Coriolanus and Alkibiades or indeed Demetrios and Antony. CHRISTOPHER
PELLING has argued that the moralism of such Lives is not one that encourages
direct action – imitation or its opposite – but rather a ‘descriptive’ one which
52
 See PELLING (1988b) 37–45. Contrast the simplistic readings of Plutarch’s Antony by some
Shakespearian scholars; e.g. COOK (1997) 91–92.
53
 There is no convincing evidence, however, that Plutarch knew the Poetics: see SANDBACH
(1982) 208, 229; ZADOROJNYI (1997) 172–173.
54
 For discussion of the precise meaning of Aristotle’s words in Poetics 13, see e.g. LUCAS
(1968) ad loc., esp. 143–144.
55
 See e.g. MURRAY (1996) 6. The apparent contradiction between Plato’s treatment of poetry
in Books 2–3, where he allows some forms of poetry for pedagogical purposes, and Book 10,
where his condemnation seems more far-reaching, is discussed by LEVIN (2001) 150–167.
56
 See above, n. 24.
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encourages the reader’s reflection on the human condition, in rather the same way
which a tragedy does.57 PHILIP STADTER, on the other hand, has put the emphasis on
the way in which Plutarch’s dramatising of the real-life combination of virtues and
vices, the moral dilemmas faced by great men, might indeed provide useful
lessons for the contemporary reader, himself likewise flawed and imperfect. In
STADTER’S view the imperfections of many of Plutarch’s subjects is important for
his programme of encouraging thought and discrimination aimed at a practical
goal: men like Demetrios and Antony might well be read as warnings to contem-
porary statesmen, particularly those who held high office in the Roman adminis-
tration, men who might meet with some of the same temptations and who might
see the failures of Demetrios and Antony as salutary examples for themselves.58 I
have myself attempted to argue that such Lives may sometimes complicate and
challenge moral assumptions themselves.59 But what all three approaches have in
common is the insistence that Plutarch’s Lives encourage the reader’s active
involvement and moral self-examination; this is, as STADTER puts it, a specifically
‘adult education’. Tragic figures like Demetrios and Antony, when met with and
examined with proper ‘discernment’, provide much food for thought.60
Such active involvement and discernment on the part of the reader is assumed,
as we have seen, in the Demetrios and Antony prologue. It is also assumed in the
Perikles and Fabius prologue, where the reader’s character is said to be improved
ouj th`/ mimhvsei … ajlla; th`/ iJstoriav/ tou` e[rgou, ‘not so much by imitating but by
investigating the work’, that is, by investigating and studying both the virtuous
deeds (‘the work of virtue’) performed by the subjects of the Lives, and Plutarch’s
own literary ‘work’ by which they are mediated (Per. 2.4). What is being imag-
ined is the reader’s own active involvement rather than a mere mechanical
imitation.61 The formal comparison (synkrisis) often dramatises this act of judge-
ment or discrimination (krisis), sometimes even addressing the reader and solicit-
ing his or her own involvement (e.g. Lys.-Sulla 5.7: w{ra dei` skopei`n).62 The
young man encountering poetry in the How a young man should listen to poems is
to be taught this kind of discrimination; the reader of the Lives must learn to see
for him or herself what is to be imitated and what not. In the Demetrios and Antony
prologue, then, Plutarch argues that if one uses judgement and discrimination then
reading about immoral men not need damage the reader – on the contrary, such
57
 PELLING (1988b) 10–18; (1995) esp. 206–208 [= repr. (2002) 237–239].
58
 STADTER (1997; 2000; 2003/4). Cf. Kim. 2.2–3 on the impossibility of complete virtue.
59
 DUFF (1999).
60
 STADTER (2000) 493.
61
 On the complexities of Per. 2.4, see DUFF (1999) 37–42.
62
 Cf. Phil.-Flam. 3.5 (skovpei); Ag./Kleom.-Gracch. 5.7 (sunora`/~ me;n ou\n kai; aujtov~). See
GOLDHILL (2002) 258–259; PELLING (2002b) 274–275. Dissonance between synkrisis and Life
might also be thought to contribute to the sense that the reader’s own judgement is required: see
DUFF (1999) 200–205; 263–286.
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figures will cause the thoughtful and discriminating reader to reflect, with that
same humanity and understanding which Plutarch expects him or her to display in
the case of the helots, on the moral lessons which such complex real-life figures
can bring. If that is the case, then Plutarch has managed to combine explicit
citation of Plato with implicit criticism and redefinition, to justify in short a very
un-Platonic presentation of the past by appealing to and adapting passages of Plato
himself.
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